[T]he interpreter looks for parallel structures and other patterns, for recurring themes, and for variations in the patterns and themes. Above all, the interpreter asks the question "why": Why this choice of word, this combination of words, this arrangement?
-Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation

Judicial interpretation of statutes (and other legislation), it turns out, is a lot like close reading, minus aesthetic concerns. The lecture on statutory interpretation was the first time in law school that a professor mentioned the "post-modern literary theory" idea that readers create meaning rather than receive it. I felt briefly at home. Then we moved on.

This quote reminds me of Gertrude Stein's insistence on repetition and variation, although in statutes repetition and variation are intended to create consistent and stable interpretations, so that the law is as transparent as possible. Stein's repetition and variation does the exact opposite, destabilizing linguistic convention as much as possible, but with the ultimate goal of simplicity (clarity, transparency?). I wonder if Stein ever wrote about language and law?

Law and Family have long been engaged in an Escherian dialectic, each shaping the other while at the same time being shaped.
- Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube, Canada v. Mossop

Escherian dialectic. Yay.

As I've said before, my utopia of poetry is a world where EVERYONE is a poet, in which all voluntarily assume the pains and pleasures that come with the highest possible sensitivity to language. - Josh Corey

There is the odd law professor with some of that sensitivity. My torts professor always stops on peculiar phrases, usually in older cases, and repeats them throughout a lecture. Unfortunately, that's usually all I remember. I'll be going into the exam this spring with a mimimal understanding of torts, but I will remember the case where the lady was "all in a pack of nerves," and the one with the wagon going "at a smartish pace." Not poetic, per se, but you take what you can get.